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ABS TRACT
This essay examines some aspects of capital flows within the OECD,
and outlines a framework for analyzing current account movements. In both
the theoretical and empirical sections, I argue for the importance of in—
cluding investment and growth in analyses of the current account. I present
empirical evidence confirming that shifts in investment rates explain a
large part of recent OECD current account behavior. In addition, the links
in theory and practice between exchange rates and the current account are
scrutinized. A link between current account deficits and depreciation
is evident for the large OECD economies, but not for many smaller European
economies. It appears that the exchange rate behavior in the smaller economies






Many aspects of international capital
mobility among developed economies
are not well Understood. There are
puzzles about the size and distribution
of current account imbalances and their
counterpart, international capital
flows, within the OECD. There arecompeting theories about the links
of exchange rate movements to thecurrent account that have notyet been
sorted out empirically. Most
fundamentally, there is doubt about the basic
degree of capital mobility, with some (likeFeldstein and llarioka [1981]),
arguing that national capital markets arehighly segmented, and others
(lilçe Harberger [1980]) arguing thathigh international capital mobility
effectively equalizes rates of return in disparatefinancial centers.
Harberger [1980] recently bemoaned thisprofessional "schizophrenia"
(p.331) in thinking about capitalflows, indicating that it points to
"a genuine ignorance on our collectivepart of how the world capital market
U'! works.—
Thisessay examines some aspects of capital flows within theOECD,
and outlines a framework foranalyzing current account movements. In
both the theoretical and empiricalsections, I argue for the importance of
including investment and growth in analyses of:the currentaccount, in
contrast to much recent work which emphasizessavings (but not investment)
decisions in current account determination. Ipresent empirical evidence
• confirming that shifts in investment rate explain a largepart of recent
OECD current account behavior.
In addition, the links in theory andpractice between exchange rates
and the current account are scrutinized. There hasbeen amazingly little
evidence brought to bear on the basic assertion thatexchange rate depreciation
is correlated with current account deficits, andappreciation with surpluses.2
The assertion •is made, but not tested, in Kouri and Macedo [1980], for
example. The hypothesized link holds up well for the larger OECD economies
and not for a number of smaller European economies characterized by large
deficitsand exchange rate appreciation in the 1970s. But on closer
scrutiny, the exchange rate behavior in the smaller countries can be
• explainedbytheir specific exchange rate policies. For these countries,
a link is found between deficits and rising nominal interest rates rather
than depreciating currencies.3
An Overview of Current Account Behavior: 1960—1979
The broad outlines of current account behavior for fourteenOECD countries
may be gleaned from Table 1. From the final line of the Table, wesee the well
known fact that the OECD as a whole went into deficitupon the 1973 oil price
hike, after a decade-and-one-half of aggregate surpluses. Evenat the point
of deepest deficits, though, the ratio of thecurrent account to gross national
product, CA/GNP, for the fourteen countries in theaggregate never fell below
-.005during 1974 to 1979. Note that the smaller countries haveconsistently
run deficits since 1960, and that CA/GNP worsened after 1973considerably more
for this group than for the largercountries, a fact which we will take up
soon.
The position of a country as a capitalimporter (i.e., with a current
account deficit) or exporter is remarkably steadyover time, and is also
tied closely with economic size, The largesteconomies (by total GNP),
Germany, Japan, and the United States, have been fairly consistentcapital
exporters, at least until the large U.S. deficits of 1977 and 1978. With
the exception of Sweden, the small countries have allbeen capital importers
for twenty years, with remarkable consistency. For thesix small countries
excluding Sweden, during 1961—79, there are only 10 observations ofsurplus
of a total of 114 annual observations. Theproportion of surplus years
between 1960 and 1979 is shown in the last column of Table 1.Of the large
countries, only Canada is consistently in deficit; of the small, none is
typically in surplus.
An indicator of the persistence of surpluses and deficitsacross years
is given by the correlation of CA/CNP for the list of countriesacross
subperiods. Between 1960—65 and 1966—73, the correlation for thirteen
countries (excluding France) is .81. For the periods l966-73 and 1974—79,4
the correlation is r =0.72,
Also, the absolute magnitude and variability of CA/GNP is negatively
related to economic size. For the group of large countries as a whole,
the 1960—79 range of CA/CNP is 0.004 to —0.004, while for the small countries,
the range is 0.003 to —0.044. The standard deviation of CA/GNP for the
large eight economies is 0.003, much less than 0.011 for the smaller
countries. This same point was made by Harberger [1980], using the ratio
of CA to gross investment i rather than to CNP. The result probably
reflects the fact that small countries are truly "small" in international
capital markets, and can borrow and lend internationally at a fairly fixed
interest rate, while larger economies face an upward sloping schedule of
international funds. We return to this point later in the paper.
Note that the deficits are a substantial fraction of gross domestic
investment in many of the countries. For the smaller countries as a group,
international capital inflows accounted for more than eleven per cent of
thefunds for gross domestic investment during 1974—79. This ratio is an
astonishing22.6 percent for Norway; Norway's deficits, we shall note
later,reflect international borrowing to finance Norway's North Sea oil
development.
My regression analysis to date has focused more on the sourcesof
shiftsin the current account, than on the reasons for persistent Imbalances,
though the theoretical discussion below clearlypoints to factors which can
explainlong periods of. international borrowing. Currentaccount flows over
decadescan be expected between countries with similar tastes but unequal
marginal productivities of capital, either because of different technologies,
adifferent industrial mix, or different initial endowments of capital.
Alternatively, CA imbalances can occur between countries with similar
technologies, but differing intertemporal consumption preferences (i.e.5
savings behavior). If differing technologies or capital endowments are
the main source of capital flows, we would expect to see persistent
deficits in economies with high investment rates. This is indeed the case
for the large versus small OECD economies. The I/GNP ratio for the smaller
six countries is consistently three to fourpercentage points above the
same ratio among the large eight economies. For our three subperiods,
these rates are given by:
1960—65 1966—73 1974—79
(I/CNP), large 8 21a .22 .22
(I/CNP), small 6 .26 .26 .25
a196165 Source: International Financial Statistics
On a country—by—country.. basis, Japan is the significant exception to
the negative link of CA/GNP and I/GNP. The Japanese CA/GNP ratio is usually
positive although the investment share I/CNP is the highest among the
fifteen countries studied. My guess is that Japanese capital controls
until the late l970s explain the low CA/GNP ratio. In the absence of
controls, Japan's extraordinary savings rates would likely have led to
large CA surpluses, and smaller investment rates. Since the capital
controls effectively bottled up the savings domestically, in spite of
Japanese home interest rates much below international levels, CA/GNP was
reduced and I/GNP was raised..
As a further check on the investment relation, I ran a cross—section
of CA/GNP and I/GNP for a number of subperiods, with and without Japan
included. These are shown as regressions 1 to 3 in Table 2.The
correlation between investment rates and CA/GNP is particularly strong
after 1970.6
Ifdiffering endowments of capital, rather than differences in techno—
logies or product mix are behind the persistent differences in investment
rates, the international flow of capita' would be from high per capita
income countries to lower per capita income countries. Surprisingly,
thesimple relationship between CA/GNP and real per capita income is
negative, not positive, and extremely weak, as shown in regression4.
Other writers have found a weak or negative relationship between per
capita income and the current account balance in examining flows between
developed and developingcountr1es.' Apparently lowper capita incomes
are, as much evidence of low total factor productivity as of low endowments
of capital per head.
]t is often thought that the recent pattern of current account
deficits and surpluses reflects in part the distribution of oil import
dependence among nations. I have argued at length in Sachs [1981] that
the links between oil dependence and deficits were rather weak in the
1970s, for good theoretical reasons. As an illustration of this
proposition, regression 5 and 6 show CA/GNP as a function of I/GNP and
oil oil .
M/GNP, where M is the value of net petroleum imports into the
country. All variables are averaged over 1970—79. There is no overall
negativerelationship between oil dependence and CA/GNPandthe oil
variable is weak and statistically insignificant. Thebasic explanation
here is that while countries with higher oil dependence, cet.
suffered greater real income losses after the oil price increases in the
197 Os, real income losses se do not lead to international borrowing.
In principle, it is crucial whether the income losses are perceived as
permanent or temporary; only in the latter case willdeficits be greatest
in countries with the largest income losses. A second part of the explanation7
is that oil—rich countries, such as Canada, Norway and the U.K., experienced
a sharp rise in investment expenditures on energy resource development,
and these expenditures contributed to current account deficits.
The links betweer investment and the current account are even
stronger when we consider shifts In international borrowing. With great
consistency, the countries that had the largest increase in CA deficits
in the 1970s were those with the sharpest rise in gross investment.
As seen in regression 7, [I/GNp)7179 —C I/GNP)6170]accounts for 66
per cent of the variance in [(CA/GNP)7179 —(CA/GNP)6170}.Since the
coefficient on investment is —0.65, a one per cent rise in the investment
rate was financed on average 0.65 per cent by foreign capital inflows, and
only0.35 per cent by gross national savings.
In principle, exogenous. increases in domestic savings rates, in
addition to shifts in investment, might explain the recent current account
behavior. Indeed the theoretical section stresses that a great variety
of shocks can potentially account for CA movements. Our empirical task is
to sort out which of the possible shocks is the likely candidate for having
moved the current account in any particular period, and here the evidence
strongly points to investment shifts as opposed to savings shifts as the
mijor influence. As seen in regression 8 in Table 2, shifts in national
savings rates are virtually uncorrelated with CA shifts between the decades
of the 1960s and 1970s. TheR2 is only 0.01, and A(S/CNP) is statistically
insignificant.
On a country—by-country time series basis, we again find a large
role for shifts in investment rates in CA swings and an apparently smaller role
for shifts in savings rates. The simple correlation (not shown) during 1961—1979
between (detrended) CA/GNP and (detrended) I/GNP Is negative in thirteen of the8
fourteen coun€ries, with r <—.50in six cases. The (detrended) savings
rates, as expected, are positively correlated to (detrended) CA/GNP, for
twelve of the fourteen countries, though. the correlation is generally
weaker; r >.50in three countries.9
AnOverview of Exchange Rate—Current Account Linkages: 1973—80
With the great extent of theorizing about current account effects
on the exchange rate, there has been remarkably littleattempt to verify
competing hypotheses. Before we explore what theory says the links
should be, let's examine what the links have been. While thereare
many potential hypotheses to test, I will focus on the view that deficit
countries will have depreciating nominal and real exchange rates, and
surplus countries the opposite. With respect to the current account
influences on the nominal exchange rate, Kouri has dubbed this view the
"accelerationist" hypothesis.
Proponents of this view, of course, recognize that domestic financial
policies can upset any simple link between deficits and depreciation, but
argue that the hypothesis is supported empirically, in spite of potential
complications. As Kouri and Macedo [1981] write:
Allowing for the effects of intervention, changes in interest rates
and so on there is still a clear tendency of currencies o surplus
countries to appreciate continuously and those of deficit countries
to depreciate continuously.
[referring to evidence on the large 7 countries] cumulative
autonomous capital flows have been insufficient to finance the
substantial imbalances that have existed since 1973. Year after
year, furthermore, they have often accentuated the pressure on the
exchange rate of deficit countries....
Table 3 offers the basic data to test this proposition. The exchange
rate for each country is a geometric weighted average of the country's
bilateral exchange rates with the other countries, where the weights are
country shares in total international trade during 1968—73. The real
exchange rate EP*/P Is similarly calculated, using the wholsale price10
index as the price variable, Among the large countries, there is a clear
pattern of nominal and real exchange rate appreciatior among surplus
countries (Germany, Japan, the Netherlands) and depreciation among the
rest (Canada, France, Italy, U.K., and U.S.). The correlations of both
nominal and real exchange rate changes with (CA/GNP) are negative for all
of the large countries except Canada. Regression equations of %(E)
on lagged %A(E) and (CA/GNP), shown in Table 4, tell a similar story.
Interestingly, the pattern seems to break down for many of the smaller
countries, where we observe large deficits together with nominal and
,rea1 exchange rate appreciations. Norway, for example, had deficits of
over 10 per cent of GNP in 1976, accompanied by real and nominal exchange
rateappreciation of over 6 per cent throughout the year. Austria,
similarly,experienced real appreciat.on in the midst of seven consecutive
years of deficit. Nor is there a negative correlation between exchange
rate movements and the current account on an annual or quarterly basis.
Inalmost all cases the correlations are positive or weakly negative, and
the regression coefficients are statistically insignificant.
Table 5 packages the data in a slightly different format, by simply
counting for each country the number of observations in which surpluses
and deficits are associated ¶.ith nominal and real appreciations and
depreciations. An statistic is used to test for independence of the
current account position ana the direction of exchange rate movement.
Again, there is a clear pattern of nominal and real depreciation cum
deficits in the large countries, versus nominal and real appreciation cum
deficits in many of the smaller countries. There are as many observations
ofdeficits with appreciation as with depreciation for the smaller
countries.
Whatexplains this difference in behavior? Clearly, a major step11
towards explanation is a difference in exchange regimes in the small and
large countries. Of the large countries, the U.S., U.K., Canada and
Japan have been floating throughout theentire period 1973—80, and France
andItaly floated for most of the period.±i Germany has been at the
center of a series of cooperative exchange arrangements, first the "Snake"
andsince March 30, 1979, the European MonetarySystem(EMS). The Dutch
guilder has remained fairly closely linked to the Deutsehemark, first in
theSnake and now in the EMS.
The smaller countries, with the exception of Australia, have all
maintainedsome linkage to a group of currencies, either formally as
members of the Snakeand EMS (Belgium, Denmark, Norway for a period), or
infoma1lyby pegging to a basket of currencies (Austria, Finland, Norway,
Sweden) Since the theory of nominal., exchange rate movements and the
currentaccount is predicated on a floating regime, itis perhaps not
surprisingthat.the smaller countries fail to support the "accelerationist"
viçw.With respect to real exchange rates, the difference in exchange
regimeprovides little answer to the differences in behaviorof large
and small countries. Most of the links between CA/GNP and P/EP*thathave
beendescribed in the literature apply to bothfixed and flexible rate
regimes,as we shall see.
Thereis still a quandry, though, with the smaller countries.If we
maintain the assumption of the imperfect substitutabilityof home and
foreignassets which underlies the accelerationist view, we knowthata
deficitcountry can peg its exchange rate only atthe expense of continued
off icial reserve outflows, or increasingly contractioflary monetarypolicies
with rising domestic interest rates.There is no evidence of significant
useof official reserves to finance the post—73 deficits,and indeed for12
these countries official reserves increased in almost all of the years
between 1973 .nd 1979. With respect to interest rates, e can check the
imperfect capital mobility assumption by examining whether interest rate
differentials with Deutschemark assets tended to increase during deficit
years for the currencies pegged to the DM (Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands,
and Norway until December 12, 1978). As seen in Table 6, there is a clear
pattern of rising differentials during the deficit years for all of the
countries. Correlations of annual changes in interest rate differentials
with CA/Y show a negative link for each of the countries except Denmark
(see Table 6 ).
Withthis brief overview,' we turn to the theoretical section. The
goal is to embed international capital flows in a model that can explain:
(1) the persistence of current accouni deficits and surpluses,(2) the
large role of investment shifts in current account movements,(3) the
co—occurrence of deficits and exchange depreciation in floating exchange
rate economies, and (4) the ambiguous links between the real exchange
rate and the current account.13
A Theoretical Model of the Current Account
In a series of recent papers, I have developed an infinite—horizon,
two-country model of the current account under assumptions of economic
growth with far-sighted households, value—maximizing competitive firms,
and efficient asset markets. Since an analytical solution to the model
isapparently beyond reach, Ihave examined the model with computer
simulations.In this section I sketch a two—period, one country analog
tothe model, that preserves the basic structure and results of the more
complete analysis. The strength of the approach is that it illustrates
how specific exogenous shocks induce particular correlations between key
variables, such as CA with P/EP and I.
Most recent models analyzing the links of the current account to
the exchange rate and to other variables, have failed to properly model
current account behavior. Typically, the current account balance is
written as a simple function of the exchange rate and current financial
wealth (as in Kouri [1981], Dornbusch and Fischer [19801, and Rodriguez
(1981]). There is almost never any treatment of physical capital accumu-
lation, and its relationship to wealth holdings. Moreover, the current
account equation gives inadequate results for many types of questions,
since the savings behavior that is implied by the equations is not
credible. Thus, in Dornbusch and Fischer [1980] for example, consumption
is not a function of human wealth, or the discounted value of domestic
output. We will see that many disturbances affect the current account
precisely by altering the discounted value of domestic output, and such
channels are necessarily ignored in the Dornbusch—Fischer model. In
Rodriguez [1980], all anticipated disturbances to the economy have an14
impacton the current account onlj through real balance effects,probably
the least important of all the relevant channels.
Failure to treat investment and capital accumulation is not an
innocent simplification, if we are to drawreal—world conclusions from
our models of exchange rate behavior. By excludingall wealth accumulation
except in the form of foreign assets, thesemodels set up a one—to—one
link between the change in wealth, and the currentaccount balance. With
domestic investment, however, real wealth may be increasingor decreasing
along with CA surpluses and deficits. Again,in Dornbusch'-FisCher, the
exchange—rate links to the current account aremediated entirely by changes
in wealth. A deficit signals decliningwealth and thus declining money
demand cmii depreciation. With investment explicitlytreated, a CA deficit
may easily be matched with riswealth and appreciation, particularly
if the deficit reflects an investment boom.
It is not enough to add investment as a componentof expenditure to
arrive at a general theory of the currentaccount. In addition, we must
includethe returns to investment as part of thewealth of firms'
shareholders and allow that wealth to affectcurrent consumption decisions.
Thisgeneral equilibrium structure is readilybuilt into the simple model
now presented.
We consider an economy which produces a singlefinal output, with price
P. The economy is small in theworld capital market, so that domestic
agents can borrow and lend in foreigndenominated bonds at a fixed interest
rate r*. The domestic output is an imperfectsubstitute in consumption
for a foreign final good that hasworld price P and domestic priceEP*,
whereE is the exchange rate. The home countryis assumed to be small in
its import market, so that P* is exogenous,and may be considered fixed.15
All international capital flows take place in one—period foreign
denominated bonds; Idenotethe end—of—period domestic net holdings of these
bondsas Z. Domestic equity is internationally tradeable, and is a perfect
substitute for Z, so that the required return on equity, in foreign
currency units, Is r*. The only outside asset denominated in domestic
currency is non—interest bearing money, M. Inside domestic bonds have
interestrate i,which may differ from the return on foreign assets
because of the portfolio preferences of domestic agents. Neither domestic
money nor the domestic bond is held by foreigners.
In assuming perfect substitutability of home equity and foreign
bonds(or foreign equity), but imperfect substitutability of domestic
and foreign bonds, I am deviating from a typical assumption that home
assets are better substitutes with each other than each is with foreign
assets. Of course, there is no theoretical assumption that is "right"
in this regard: relative asset substitutability depends on the nature of
underlyingstochastic shocks in the economy, and on the structure of
trade. Kouri [19811 has pursued the hard work of linking an array of
exogenous disturbances to optimal asset demand functions in a general
equilibrium model. We are still far off from concrete results in this
area for open—economy macroeconomic models, and I do not pursue the
ambitious task of solving endogenously for the structure of portfolio
choices.
Households make their consumption decisions to maximize a two-period,
additively separable utility function, subject to the constraint that the
discounted value of consumption must equal initial wealth16
-
max U(CD,CF) +U(C,C) (1)
cl,C1,c2,c2
S.t. + c) + 1-r* (ir2C + C) =W1
In this equation, iris theperiod trelativeprice of home goods to foreign
goods (ii= andW1 is the initial wealth,in units of the foreign
final, good. C is consumption of the home good, and C is consumption
of the foreign good. By additive separability, the household firstdetermines
total spending each period + C, and then determines the composition
of spending between C and C.
(1-ct)
To stay as simple as possible, I choose U(•,) to be log (C C )












The discounted value of expenditure on each of the goodsC, C, C, C
is a constant share of wealth by the assumption on utility.
Managers are assumed to maximize themarket value of firms. By the
assumption that the cost of capital r* is setin the world equity market,
firm valuation is simply the present discountedvalue of total earnings,
net of investment expenditur.e (Ii):
—
V= — 7t1w1L—Ii)+ l+r* (3)
Output is produced according to the productionfunction =F(K,Lt)
and
K2 =K1+Il
(I assume that all capital goods are imported, sothat
investment expenditure in terms of the foreign good Ialso equals the
quantity of new capital.) We will assumeContinuouS full employment17
L1L. Obviously, first-order conditions for value maximization are
given by:
_....
:7T2 = (1+ r*) (4)
In the spirit of simplicity, I will assume that the production function
Is Cobb—Douglas, with =
Domesticwealth is given by the sum of human wealth (H), domestic
ownership of equities, and net foreign investment. I will assume that
households own the entire domestic capital stock, and that all international
capital flows are chages in Z. There are no initial holdings of Z. In
this model, the issue of portfolio composition between equity and Z is
unimportant since equities and Z earn the same rate of return. All that
matters Is that at the beginning of the first period, domestic households
own the claims to domestic firms. Human wealth is the present value of
total labor earnings iT1w1L1 + (i12w2L2)/(l+r*). Adding up the Components






Domestic money demand is set, without formal justification, according
to a transaction demand specification
=Q (l-1-i)0 (6)
Here, real balances are an increasing function of domestic output and a
declining function of the domestic interest rate i. Because this is a
two—period model, second period money demand is inherently problematic
as there are presumably no alternative assets to money in the last period18
(andthus no second—period interest rate 1) and no explicit reasontohold
money. I will arbitrarily fixi2
to the exogenous world interest rate
1* (any constant would do); a better sdlution only emerges in an infinite
horizon model, or in a finite—horizon model with a very explicit
transactions technology.
The domestic interest rate is determined according to portfolio
preferences for home versus foreign assets. AsI've noted, in more
sophisticated models the pbrtfolioproblem is solved with explicit
attentionto the types of shocks in the economic environment. Here I
fall back to a reduced formspecification,as in a model of Kouri [1981),
in which the nominal interest rate differential between the homeand foreign
asset, net of expected exchange rate changes, is a decliningfunction of
the stock of foreign assetsheld domestically:
[1 + Y't÷l(lii*)] =f(Z)f'(Z)< 0, f(0) -1,f
>o
(7)
In our two period case, Z1CA1. In a multiperiodmodel, Z
=ECAL.
1=1
The model is completed by adding an export demand equation






*isa world export demand shift varable, presumably reflectingforeign
income or wealth.
Our goal is to solve for CA1, the first period current account,and to
relate CA1 to the parameters of the model, and to E2/E1and 112/111, the
rates of nominal and real exchange rate change.The first—period current account19
at world prices, is simply given by,
CA1n1(Q1 -Cf)-C - (10)
and CA2 =
—CA1by the household budget constraint. From (2), we have
consumption as a function of W, and in (5), we have the definition of W.
Thus, substituting in (10), we can write CA1 as





Ofcourse this expression is not yet in final form, since 711, 1T2 Q2and
I are endogenous, and indeed Q2isa function of I. Still, (11) points
up the three fundamental determinants of current account balance. The
first term on the right hand side shows that CA1 is an increasing function
of the difference between the world interest rate and the rate of time
preference (r*_cS). This difference determines the desire to save income
for later consumption. In the Continuous time version of the present
model, t1 =(r*_i5)W,so that r*_tS in fact determines the path of overall
wealth accumulation.
The second term might be described as capturing the role of transitory
fluctuations in current account determination. When export demand falls te.rnporarily
in a given year, pulling down real income, households dissave not because
they are poor but because their transito income is less than permanent
income. In the attempt to smooth the income stream, households borrow in
early periods if the real income stream is rising, and lend Initially if
the real income stream is falling. Thus, CA1 decreases with (rr2Q2 —
1T1Q1).
The third term highlights the special role of investment in current
account determination. Since CA1 = — (C+711C + Ii), the effects on
CA1 of an exogenous shock that causes I to rise depend on the effects of
the shock on C +iT1C. To the extent that the shock has no effect on20
household wealth, consumption will not change; (ir1C + C + and thus
the deficit (l1+ir1C+ C -Q1)willrise one—for—one with the investment
boom. This is precisely the case for a rise in investment projects
that just earn the market rate of return, r*. If domestically owned
firms retain earnings to invest in projects with return r*, households
dissave by the same amount, keeping C1 constant. Though the first—period
dividend flow to households is reduced by the rise in I, households
'!pierce the corporate veil," and dissave. They effectively substitute
the firms' investment for their household savings, so that total absorption
is increased one—for—one with I.
Sometimes a rise in I also signals "good news" that raises household
wealth. For instance an anticipated rise in future world demand for
domestic output raises both I and W. In this case, both + C and
I rise, and the deficit worsens morethan one—for—one with the increase
in I.
To solve for the reduced form for CA1, and and 1T2 we must first
determine wealth W in terms of the underlying parameters: Y, Y, r*, K1,
ô. A couple of facts are helpful here, First, by the assumption of









Second, 111Q1 and 7T2Q2 are linear in W, Y, and Y. When the consumption
and investment equations are plugged into (5) and (9), we find WOJ C,
1 _____






We will interpret this expression shortly. To find the terms of trade
iTt,




(Remember that Q1 is fixed, since K1 is predetermined, L1 =t,and
Q1 =F(K1,L1).)7r2 is found similarly, though now Q2 is endogenous. To
find Q2, we use the investment equation (12), K2 =
K1+ I, and Q2 =LB




Finally, the ratio 7r2/1r1is given, after a bit of algebra, by:
—c(1+r*)Y*+ [(2+5) —ct(l+S)]Y*+ c(1+r*)K I
1 [(2-I-5)—BcL]Y + [a(l+cS) /(l+r*)JY + c,(l+5)K1 ICi
These bulky equations are in fact easy to interpret. To start with
CA1, a rise in cet. necessarilyimproves the current account.. and
an anticpated rise in Y necessarily worsens the current account. In
both cases, the rise in world demand causes an increase in wealth, and in
11, 71, and Il• But when Y rises, households save some of the first
period income gain (i.e. run a surplus) to spread the consumption windfall
across time; when rises, households borrow against the anticipated
future windfall to enjoy higher consumption in the initial period.
Since an increase in Y* in either period leads to a demand increase in
both periods, ir and 112 both rise. Also, I rises, since rr2Q2 is increased,
and I is linear in second—period real income (see (12)).
An equal rise in and has an ambiguous effect on CA1. But in
the benchmark case r* =5,a "permanent" rise in Y (i.e. dY =dY)
leads
to a deficit on CA1! This is sharply counter to the conventional view22
that the current account :Linproves when demand shifts permanently towards
a country. But the reason is clear enough. Higher Y* increases investment




negative. In a model without
investment (e.g.=1, =0in the present case), and with =
r=5,a rise in 'f* has no effect on the current account. Rather, iT1
and 112 rise in equal proportion, and the value of exports and imports
rise by the same amount.
Finally, note that CA1 is an increasing function of the initial
endowmentof capital. Higher K1, cet. p., reduces 11/K1, which in turn
induces animprovement in the current account. All other things equal,
capital flows should lead from highlycapital—endowedeconomies to
poorly capital—endowed economies.
What can we say about the links of CA1 and realdepreciation?It
is possible to find every combinations of CA1 0 together with ff2/ill
What is crucial is the source of the current account imbalance.Consider
two countries that are identical except for .Wecan easily verify
CA1
from(16) that—k
<0, and from (14) that —<0. Thus, when
current account differences reflect taste differences, highdeficit
countries will experience real depreciation. On the other hand,for two
countries that are identical except for future demand 'f*2, the opposite
conclusion is reached. Higher Y unambiguously leads to higher 112/ill,
and to a fall in CA1. Similarly, a temporary decline In worlddemand
(dY < 0; dY =0)causes 112/ill to rise and CA1 to fall. First—period
deficits are again associated with real exchange rate appreciation.If
the countries differ only in K1 the effects on the relative ¶2'ilare
ambiguous. In general, withI
and r*, faster growing countries
will see a larger decline in 112/ill.Since growth in Q2/Q1 is inversely23
relatedto K1, we should expect, cet. par., that countries with initially
poor endowments of capital to experience relative large real exchange
rate depreciation over time. As noted above, such countries will also,
cet. par., have larger CA deficits.
At this point, we can bring in the monetary side to find the links
between CA1 and nominal exchange rates. The monetary subsystem was given
in (6) and (7). Noting that P1 =(E1P*)ir1and '2 =(E2P*)1r2and sub—
stituting into the money demand equations, we can write:




From the portfolio equation (7),(l+r*)/(l+i)=
(E1/E2)f(CA1).Remember
that6 measures the substitutability of home and foreign denominated
nominal bonds, with £ =1for the case of perfect substitutability. Thus,
plugging into (17), we have
E N /(1+0) —11(1+0) 2=[(2)(1)11/ (14 ) [f(CA1)
1 (18)
i. 17t2 Q




N1 2 712 111 [f(cA)] (19a)
E2 =N2Q2'(1+i*) Ott (19b)
Notsurprisingly, both real and purelymonetary factors affect the exchange
rates. Changes in N1and N2 can move E1 and E2 with no effects on CA1, it1,
etc.under the assumptions of the model. For given N1, N2, real
exchange rate appreciations and depreciations tend to cause nominal exchange
rate appreciations and depreciations. Thus, as Stockman [1980] has indicated,
much of the observed correlation between changes in E and EP*/P may be due24
to common responses to underlying shocks. This is in contrast tothe more
typical assumption thatchangesin E cause EP*/P to move because of
nominal price rigidity.
We also see a direct effect of CA imbalance on the nominal exchange
rate,working through the Kouri—Branson portfolio demandchannel. Thus,
even if a deficit economy is on a path of real appreciation,rising output,
and stable money supply, it may experience nominal depreciation asits
net indebtedness grows over time. Of course only inthe case of perfect
capital mobility, f= 0, does this effect go away.
Thus, to sumup,a deficit country will surely experience nominaland
real depreciation if the deficit is caused by high5. If, onthe contrary,
the deficits arise from a path of increasing Y', then T2/1T1will be
large, and the nominal exchange rate willtend to appreciate unless -fis also
large.25
Extensions and Conclusions
There are at least three important directions for extending the
theoretical framework described above. hese are: a multiperiod or
infinite—horizon analysis with more general functional forms; the intro-
duction of capital control restrictions as a policy instrument; and an
explicit treatment of portfolio considerations in a setting with un-
certainty and risk averse agents.
The first is, in a sense, easy and already accomplished (cf. Sachs
[1982, forthcoming], Lipton and Sachs [1980]). An infinite horizon, two—
country version of the model here has been developed and analyzed through
simulation. There is no reason to stick with particular functional forms as
in the model in this paper once recourse is made to computer simulation.
Thus, in work now underway with Michael Bruno, a three—sector infinite—
horizon model of the U.K. is being developed, that incorporates a complete
input—output structure in the production technology.
The second extension, to explicitly treat restrictions on capital
mobility, would allow a more accurate depiction of the degree of capital
mobility among the OECD economies. Most of the major economies have or
continue to resort to restrictions on international capital flows to help
achieve current account and other objectives. Foreign access to the U.S.
bond market was effectively closed until 1974, and until much more
recently in Japan. Our understanding of theoretical aspects of capital
controls is still rather limited, and controls are rarely brought in ex-
plicitly .into theoretical work.
The third direction is by far the hardest. To this point we have
very little feel for the relevant sources ofrisk that lead to the imperfect
substitutability of assets across national borders. Our models willhave
radically different conclusions if imperfect substitutability is•based on26
inflation risk, default risk, political risk, or hedging behavioragainst
still other types of real disturbances. It seems thatthe most fruitful w2y
to proceed here is to build small theortical models,with attention to a
limited number of key stochastic elements, so that portfoliobehavior may
be derived endogenously.FOOTNOTES
1/Harberger, A.C., "Vignettes on the World Capital Market," American
Economic Review, May, 1980.
2/For background on the extensive role of Japanese Capital Controls
until the mid—'l970's, see Seki, Kaname, "Foreign Exchange Law,"
the Japan Business Law Journal, Vol. 1 (July 1980).
3/Halevi, N., "An Empirical Test of the Balance of Payments States'
Hypothesis," Journal of International Economics, Vol 1 (February 1971).
4/Until, of course, joining the European Monetary System in 1979.
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Canada —.019 —.003 —.020 .011 .12
France NA NA —.006 .024 .39







Netherlands .010 .005 .01 —.050 .65
U.K. —.002 .003 —.012 .058 .52
U.S. .007 .001 .000 —.004 .69
Average, Large 8 004a .004 .004 —.003 .55
Small Countries
Australia —.029 —.021 —.023 .094 .09
Austria —.001 —.008 —.029 .105 .23
Denmark —.015 —.021 —.033 .138 .16
Finland 016a —.014 —.027 .080 .15
Norway —.025 —.015 —.080 .226 .17
Sweden .000 .001 —.016 .076 .33
Average, Small 6 012a —.012 —.030 .118 .19
Average, All 003a .004 —.002 .009 .38
a 1961—1965
Source: Current account balance







OECD MainEconomic Indicators, Historical
International Financial Statistics,TABLE 2










































8.ExcludingFranceb GNP =—.01—.15 (S/GNP) .01
(1971—79) (1.1) (.34)
—(1961—70)
a Numbers in parentheses aret_statisticS
b Missing Observations for France preventedinclusion
Sources: CA from OECD Main EconomicIndicatGrS CNP from internationalFinancial Statistics.
I is total gross investment, including
inventory accumulation, fromIFS. Savings,
S, are defined as I + CA. Thenotation ( or197l—79 indicates a
simple arithmetic average overthe years in icate .L((i97j79) indicates
—(19.61-70)
i—
— )_7Q1. The full countrylist is as is
inTable1.TABLE 3
THECURRENT ACCOUNT AND EXCHANGE RATE MOVEMENTS
End 1973 —End1979
(CA/GNP) % (E) % (EP*/P)









Canada —.020 5.0 3.8 .09 .28
France —.006 —1.2 —0.2 —.38 --.59
Germany .010 —7.5 —2,1 —.28 —.29
Italy —.002 7.5 —0.7 —.31 —.26
Japan .003 —1.0 0.3 .58 —.71
Netherlands .011 —5.4 —1.1 —.10 —.50
U.K,. —.012 3.5 —2.6 —.14 .—.06
U.S. .000 3.0 2.6 —.40 —.58
Small Six
Australia —.023 4.5 2.5 —.11 —.54
Austria —.029 —6.6 —1.6 .27 .29
Denmark —.033 —1.1 —1.3 .04 —.05
Finland —.027 0.7 —1.4 .01 .49
Norway —.080 —1.9 —1.0 .04 —.19
Sweden —.016 0.5 —1.1 . —.29 .05
a Quarterly, 1974:1 —1979:4
.
•b Annual, 1973 —1979
Source: CA and GNP as
log(E1) =[E
j3i .
total exports plus imports, onaverage,during1968—73.That is,
= (X+M) /[ (Xk + 14k)]
values of
in Table 1. The exchange rate for country I is calculated as
Wjlog(E1)]/(1—w1),
where w. Is,the share of country j in
with X., M. equal to the dollar
1968—73
total exports and imports for country j. E.. is an index of the
end—of—period bilateral exchange rate between countries I, j, In units of
currency I per unit of currency j CE1. E1in l975) The series E1. Is
calculated from the International Financial Statistics, IMF, using the series -
Laeforeach country. EP*/P is analogously calculated as
log(E1P*/P1)= [E w4 1og(E.P4*/P1)], with P. the wholesale price index
j?i 3



































United KIngdom 74:1 —
80:3




















































































80:4 .005 —.279 —.07 —.006
(.35) (.48) (.35) (.03)
.013 1.9].
Austria 74:1 — (054)(84)
.02 2.08
804
—.012 .180 —.290 —.35
•
(1.31) (.88) (1.5) (1.8) .18 1.61
Denmark 74:1 (.19)
.001 1.77
—.006 —.12 —.03 —.24 4 8 79.4
(.48) (.32) (.13) (.91)
.0 1.7
Finland 74:1 — (47) (05)
.000 1.93





0.0 .02 .09 —.22 06 1 95 79:4






(1.36) (1.61) (1.62) (.147)TABLE 5
ThEP!ACCELERATIONIST" HYPOTHESIS:
CAAND EXCHANGE RATE CHANGES,ANNUAL
OBSERVATIONS, 197 3—1980
Percent of
Number of Years in Which:
Observations
in
Surplus— Deficit— Surplus Deficit Support of
Appt cc iat ionDepr ec iat ionDepr ec iat ion aion HypotheSi
iht
Canada
Nominal 0 3 1 4 37.5
Real 0 4 1 3 50
France
Nominal 2 2 0 4 50
Real 2 5 0 1 87.5
Germany
Nominal 5 1 1 1 75
Real 5 2 1 0 87.5
Italy
Nominal 1 3 2 0 67
Real 2 2 1 2 57
Japan
Nominal 3 2 0 3 62.5
Real 3 3 0 2 67
Netherlands
Nominal 4 0 1 2 57
Real 4 1 1 1 71
U.K.
Nominal 1 4 1 2 62.5
Real 2 2 0 4 50
U.S.
Nominal 3 3 2 0 75
Real 2 2 3 1 50
Subtotal, Large 8
Nominal 19 18 8 16 60.5
Real 20 21 7 .14 775Australia
Nominal 1 5 0 2 75
Real 1 4 0 3 67.5
Austria
Nominal 0 2 0 6 25
Real 0 4 0 4 50
Denmark
Nominal 0 4 0 4 50
Real 0 4 0 4 50
Finland
Nominal 0 2 1 5 25
Real 0 1 1 5 12.5
Norway
Nominal 0. 3 1 4 37.5
Real 1 4 0 3 62.5
Sweden
Nominal 0 3 1 4 37.5
Real 0 3 1 4 37.5
Subtotal, Small 6
Nominal 1 19 3 25 41.5
Real 2 20 2 24 46.0
Total,(15) Countries
Nominal 20 37 11 41 52.0
Real 22 41 9 38 57.0
= LargeEight, Nominal p <.io.
X
7.1Large Eight, Real p <.01
X =1.5Small Six, Nominal p >.10
=0.0Small Six, Real p >.10
X =1.3Total, Nominal p >.10
=4.7Total, Real p <.05
aPearson statisticT
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